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Abstract. We introduce the State Classification Problem (SCP) for hybrid sys-
tems, and present Neural State Classification (NSC) as an efficient solution tech-
nique. SCP generalizes the model checking problem as it entails classifying each
state s of a hybrid automaton as either positive or negative, depending on whether
or not s satisfies a given time-bounded reachability specification. This is an in-
teresting problem in its own right, which NSC solves using machine-learning
techniques, Deep Neural Networks in particular. State classifiers produced by
NSC tend to be very efficient (run in constant time and space), but may be sub-
ject to classification errors. To quantify and mitigate such errors, our approach
comprises: i) techniques for certifying, with statistical guarantees, that an NSC
classifier meets given accuracy levels; ii) tuning techniques, including a novel
technique based on adversarial sampling, that can virtually eliminate false neg-
atives (positive states classified as negative), thereby making the classifier more
conservative. We have applied NSC to six nonlinear hybrid system benchmarks,
achieving an accuracy of 99.25% to 99.98%, and a false-negative rate of 0.0033
to 0, which we further reduced to 0.0015 to 0 after tuning the classifier. We be-
lieve that this level of accuracy is acceptable in many practical applications, and
that these results demonstrate the promise of the NSC approach.
1 Introduction
Model checking of hybrid systems is usually expressed in terms of the following reach-
ability problem for hybrid automata (HA): given an HA M, a set of initial states I ,
and a set of unsafe states U , determine whether there exists a trajectory of M start-
ing in an initial state and ending in an unsafe state. The time-bounded version of this
problem considers trajectories that are within a given time bound T . It has been shown
that reachability problems and time-bounded reachability problems for HA are unde-
cidable [16], except for some fairly restrictive classes of HA [7,16]. HA model checkers
cope with this undecidability by providing approximate answers to reachability [13].
This paper introduces the State Classification Problem (SCP), a generalization of
the model checking problem for hybrid systems. Let B = {0, 1} be the set of Boolean
values. Given an HA M with state space S, time bound T , and set of unsafe states
U ⊂ S, the SCP problem is to find a function F ∗ : S −→ B such that for all s ∈ S,
F ∗(s) = 1 if it is possible for M, starting in s, to reach a state in U within time T ;
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F ∗(s) = 0 otherwise. A state s ∈ S is called positive if F ∗(s) = 1. Otherwise, s is
negative. We call such a function a state classifier.
SCP generalizes the model checking problem. Model checking, in the context of
SCP, is simply the problem of determining whether there exists a positive state in the
set of initial states. Its intent is not to classify all states in S.
Classifying the states of a complex system is an interesting problem in its own right.
State classification is also useful in at least two other contexts. First, due to random
disturbances, a hybrid system may restart in a random state outside the initial region,
and we may wish to check the system’s safety from that state. Secondly, a classifier can
be used for online model checking [26], where in the process of monitoring a system’s
behavior, one would like to determine, in real-time, the fate of the system going forward
from the current (non-initial) state.
This paper shows how deep neural networks (DNNs) can be used for state classifi-
cation, an approach we refer to as Neural State Classification (NSC). An NSC classifier
is subject to false positives (FPs) – a state s is deemed positive when it is actually neg-
ative, and, more importantly, false negatives (FNs) – s is deemed negative when it is
actually positive.
A well-trained NSC classifier offers high accuracy, runs in constant time (approxi-
mately 1 millisecond, in our experiments), and takes constant space (e.g., a DNN with
l hidden layers and n neurons only requires functions of dimension l · n for its encod-
ing). This makes NSC classifiers very appealing for applications such as online model
checking, a type of analysis subject to strict time and space constraints. NSC classifiers
can also be used in runtime verification applications where a low probability of FNs is
acceptable, e.g., performance-related system monitoring.
Our approach can also classify states of parametric HA by simply encoding each
parameter as an additional input to the classifier. This makes NSC more powerful than
state-of-the-art hybrid system reachability tools that have little or no support for para-
metric analysis [12,13]. In particular, we can train a classifier that classifies states of
any instance of the parameterized HA, even instances with parameter values not seen
during training.
NSC-based classification can be lifted from states to (convex) sets of states by
applying output-range estimation [29]. Such techniques can be used to compute safe
bounds for the given state region.
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Fig. 1: Overview of the NSC approach.
The NSC method is summarized in Fig. 1. We train the state classifier using su-
pervised learning, where the training examples are derived by sampling the state and
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parameter spaces according to some distribution. Reachability values for the examples
are computed by invoking an oracle, i.e., an hybrid system model checker [13] or a
simulator when the system is deterministic.
We consider three sampling strategies: uniform, where every state is equi-probable,
balanced, which seeks to improve accuracy by drawing a balanced number of posi-
tive and negative states, and dynamics-aware, which assigns to each state the estimated
probability that the state is visited in any time-bounded evolution of the system. The
choice of sampling strategy depends on the intended application of NSC. For example,
in the case of online model checking, dynamics-aware sampling may be the most ap-
propriate. For balanced sampling, we introduce a method to generate arbitrarily large
sets of positive samples based on constructing and simulating reverse HAs.
NSC is not limited to DNN-based classifiers. We demonstrate that other machine-
learning models for classification, such as support vector machines (SVMs) and binary
decision trees (BDTs), also provide powerful solution techniques.
Given the impossibility of training machine-learning models with guaranteed accu-
racy w.r.t. the true input distribution, we evaluate a trained state classifier by estimating
its accuracy, false-positive rate, and false-negative rate (together with their confidence
intervals) on a test dataset of fresh samples. This allows us to quantify how well the
classifier extrapolates to unseen states, i.e., the probability that it correctly predicts
reachability for any state.
Inspired by statistical model checking [24], we also provide statistical guarantees
through sequential hypothesis testing to certify (up to some confidence level) that the
classifier meets prescribed accuracy levels on unseen data. Note that the systems we
consider are nonprobabilistic. The statistical guarantees we provide are for the proba-
bility that the classifier makes the correct prediction. In contrast, the aim of probabilistic
model checking [22] and statistical model checking [24] is to compute the probability
that a probabilistic system satisfies a given correctness property. Relatedly, the focus of
neural network (NN) verification [18,11,21] is on proving properties of an NN’s output
rather than the NN’s accuracy.
We also consider two tuning methods that can reduce and virtually eliminate false
negatives: a new method called falsification-guided adaptation that iteratively re-trains
the classifier with false negatives found through adversarial sampling; and threshold
selection, which adjusts the NN’s classification threshold to favor FPs over FNs.
Our experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and promise of our approach,
evaluated on six nonlinear hybrid system benchmarks. We consider shallow (1 hidden
layer) and deep (3 hidden layers) NNs with sigmoid and ReLU activation functions. Our
techniques achieve a prediction accuracy of 99.25% to 99.98% and a false-negative rate
of 0.0033 to 0, taking into account the best classifier for each of the six models, with
DNNs yielding superior accuracy than shallow NNs, SVMs, and BDTs. We believe that
such a range for the FN rate is acceptable in many practical applications, and we show
how this can be further improved through tuning of the classifiers.
In summary, our main contributions are the following:
– We introduce the State Classification Problem for hybrid systems.
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– We develop the Neural State Classification method for solving the SCP, including
techniques for sampling, establishing statistical guarantees on a classifier’s accu-
racy, and reducing its FN rate.
– We introduce a new technique for constructing the reverse HA of a given HA, for a
general class of HAs, and use reverse HAs to generate balanced training datasets.
– We introduce a falsification-guided adaptation algorithm for eliminating FNs, thereby
producing conservative state classifiers.
– We provide an extensive evaluation on six nonlinear hybrid system models.
2 Problem Formulation
We introduce the problem of learning a state classifier for a hybrid automaton and a
bounded reachability property. First, we define these terms.
Definition 1 (Hybrid automaton). A hybrid automaton (HA) is a tuple M = (Loc,
Var , Init ,Flow ,Trans, Inv), where Loc is a finite set of discrete locations (or modes);
Var = {x1, . . . , xn} is a set of continuous variables, evaluated over a continuous
domain X ⊆ Rn; Init ⊆ S(M) is the set of initial states, where S(M) = Loc ×
X is the state space of M; Flow : Loc −→ (X −→ X) is the flow function, defining
the continuous dynamics at each location; Trans is the transition relation, consisting
of tuples of the form (l, g, v, l′), where l, l′ ∈ Loc are source and target locations,
respectively, g ⊆ X is the guard, and v : X −→ X is the reset; Inv : Loc −→ 2X is the
invariant at each location.
We also consider parameterized HA in which the flow, guard, reset and invariant may
have parameters whose values are constant throughout an execution. We treat parame-
ters as continuous variables with flow equal to zero and identity reset map.
The behavior of an HAM can be described in terms of its trajectories. A trajectory
may start from any state; it does not need to start from an initial state. For time bound
T ∈ R≥0, let T = [0, T ] ⊆ R≥0 be the time domain.
Definition 2 (Trajectory [3]). For HAM = (Loc,Var , Init ,Flow , Trans, Inv), time
domainT = [0, T ], let ρ : T −→ S(M) be a function mapping time instants into states of
M. For t ∈ T, let ρ(t) = (l(t),x(t)) be the state at time t, with l(t) being the location
and x(t) the vector of continuous variables. Let (ξi)i=0,...,k ∈ Tk+1 be the ordered
sequence of time points where mode jumps happen, i.e., such that ξ0 = 0, ξk = T , and
for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1 and for all t ∈ [ξi, ξi+1), l(t) = l(ξi). Then, ρ is a trajectory
of M if it is consistent with the invariants: ∀t ∈ T. x(t) ∈ Inv(l(t)); flows: ∀t ∈
T. x˙(t) = Flow(l(t))(x(t)); and transition relation: ∀i < k. ∃(l(ξi), g, v, l(ξi+1)) ∈
Trans. x(ξ−i+1) ∈ g ∧ x(ξi+1) = v(x(ξ−i+1)).
Definition 3 (Time-bounded reachability). Given an HAM, set of statesU ⊆ S(M),
state s ∈ S(M), and time bound T , decide whether there exists a trajectory ρ ofM
starting from s and t ∈ [0, T ] such that ρ(t) ∈ U , denotedM |= Reach(U, s, T ).
Definition 4 (Positive and negative states). Given an HAM, set of statesU ⊆ S(M),
called unsafe states, and time bound T , a state s ∈ S(M) is called positive ifM |=
Reach(U, s, T ), i.e., an unsafe state is reachable from s within time T . Otherwise, s is
called negative.
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We will use the term positive (negative) region forM’s set of positive (negative) states.
Definition 5 (State classification problem). Given an HAM, set of statesU ⊆ S(M),
and time bound T , find a function F ∗ : S(M) −→ B such that F ∗(s) = M |=
Reach(U, s, T ) for all s ∈ S(M).
It is easy to see that the model checking problem for hybrid systems can be expressed as
an SCP in which the domain of F ∗ is the set of initial states Init , instead of the whole
state space. SCP is therefore a generalization of the model checking problem.
Sample sets are used by NSC to learn state classifiers and to evaluate their perfor-
mance. Unsafe states are trivially positive (for any T ), so we exclude them from the
sampling domain. Each sample consists of a state s and Boolean b which is the answer
to the reachability problem starting from state s. We call (s, 1) a positive sample and
(s, 0) a negative sample. Both kinds of samples are generally needed for adequately
learning a classifier.
Definition 6 (Sample set). For modelM, set of states U ⊆ S(M), and time bound T ,
a sample set is any finite set {(s, b) ∈ (S(M) \ U)× B | b = (M |= Reach(U, s, T ))}
The derivation of an NSC classifier reduces to a supervised learning problem, specif-
ically, a binary classification problem. Given a sample setD called the training set, NSC
approximates the exact state classifier F ∗ in Definition 5 by learning a total function
F : (S(M) \ U)→ B from D.
Learning F typically corresponds to finding values of F ’s parameters that minimize
some measure of discrepancy between F and the training set D. We do not require that
the learned function agree with the D on every state that appears in D, because this can
lead to over-fitting to D and hence poor generalization to other states.
To evaluate the performance of F , we use three standard metrics: accuracy PA, i.e,
the probability that F produces the correct prediction; the probability of false positives,
PFP; and the probability of false negatives, PFN. In safety-critical applications, achiev-
ing a low FN rate is typically more important than achieving a low FP rate. Precisely
computing these probabilities is, in general, infeasible. We therefore compute an em-
pirical accuracy measure, false-positive rate, and false-negative rate over a test set D′
containing n fresh samples not appearing in the training set as follows:
PˆA =
1
n
∑
(s,b)∈D′
1F (s)=b , PˆFP =
1
n
∑
(s,b)∈D′
1F (s)∧¬b , PˆFN =
1
n
∑
(s,b)∈D′
1¬F (s)∧b (1)
where 1 is the indicator function. We obtain statistically sound bounds for these proba-
bilities through the Clopper-Pearson method for deriving precise confidence intervals.
3 Neural State Classification
This section introduces the main components of the NSC approach.
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3.1 Neural Networks for Classification
NSC uses feedforward neural networks, a type of neural network with one-way con-
nections from input to output layers [23]. NSC uses both shallow NNs, with one hidden
layer and one output layer, and deep NNs, with multiple hidden layers. Additional back-
ground on NNs is provided in Appendix C.
An NN defines a real-valued function F (x). When using an NN for classification,
a classification threshold θ is specified, and an input vector x is classified as positive if
F (x) ≥ θ, and as negative otherwise.
The theoretical justification for using NNs to solve the SCP is the following. In [17],
it is shown that shallow feedforward NNs are universal approximators; i.e., with appro-
priate parameters, they can approximate any Borel-measurable function arbitrarily well
with a finite number of neurons (and just one hidden layer). Under mild assumptions,
this also applies to the true state classifier F ∗ of the SCP (Definition 5). A proof of this
claim is given in Appendix A.1 . Arbitrarily high precision might not be achievable in
practice, as it would require significantly large training sets and numbers of neurons,
and a precise learning algorithm. Nevertheless, NNs are extremely powerful.
3.2 Oracles
Given a state (sample) s of an HA M , an NSC oracle is a procedure for labeling s; i.e.,
for deciding whetherM |= Reach(U, s, T ). NSC utilizes the following oracles.
Reachability checker. For nonlinear HA, NSC uses dReal [13], an SMT solver that
supports bounded model checking of such HA. dReal provides sound unsatisfiability
proofs, but satisfiability is approximated up to a user-defined precision (δ-satisfiability).
The oracle first attempts to verify that s is negative by checkingM |= Reach(U, s, T )
for unsatisfiability. If this instance is instead δ-sat, the oracle attempts to prove the
unsatisfiability of M |= ¬Reach(U, s, T ), which would imply that s is positive. The
latter instance can also be δ-sat, meaning that this oracle cannot make a decision about s.
This situation never occurred in our evaluation and can be made less likely by choosing
a small δ. If it did occur, our plan would be to conservatively mark the state as positive.
The oracle requires an upper bound on the number of discrete jumps to be considered.
It supports HAs with Lipschitz continuous dynamics and hyperrectangular continuous
domains (i.e., defined as the product of closed intervals), and allows trigonometric and
other non-polynomial functions in the initial conditions, guards, invariants, and resets.
Simulator. For deterministic systems, we implemented a simulator based on MATLAB’s
ode45 variable-step ODE solver. To check reachability, we employ the solver’s event-
detection method to catch relevant zero-crossing events (i.e., reaching U ).
Backwards simulator. The backwards simulator is not an oracle per se, but, as described
in Section 3.3, is central to one of our sampling methods. We first construct the reverse
HA according to Definition 7, which is more general than the one for rectangular HAs
given in [16]. We use dot-notation to indicate members of a tuple, and lift resets v to
sets of states; i.e., v(X ′) = {v(x) | x ∈ X ′}.
Definition 7 (Reverse HA). Given an HA M, its reverse HA ←−M is an HA such that
the modes, continuous variables, and invariants are the same as forM, the flows are
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reversed, i.e., ∀(l, x) ∈ S(M), ←−M.Flow(l)(x) = −M.Flow(l)(x), and for each tran-
sition (l, g, v, l′) ∈ M.Trans , the corresponding transition (l′,←−g ,←−v , l) ∈ ←−M.Trans
must be such that←−g = v(g) and←−v is the inverse of v if v is injective; otherwise,←−v up-
dates the continuous state x to any value in the set←−v (x) = {x′ | x′ ∈ g ∧ v(x′) = x}.3
Although every HA admits a reverse counterpart according to Definition 7, it is
clearly impractical to find a reverse reset function←−v (x) if v is a one-way function. For
an example of reversible HA with non-injective reset functions, see the HA and reverse
HA in Appendix D.4.
Note that a deterministic HA may admit a nondeterministic reverse HA. Since we
classify all states in the state space, we assume thatM and←−M can be initialized to any
state. We next define the notion of a reverse trajectory←−ρ , which intuitively is obtained
by running ρ backwards, starting from ρ’s last state and ending with its first state.
Definition 8 (Reverse trajectory). For HA M, time domain T = [0, T ], trajectory
ρ with its corresponding sequence of switching time points (ξi)i=0,...,k ∈ Tk+1, the
reverse trajectory ←−ρ = (l(t),x(t)) of ρ and its corresponding sequence of switching
time points
(←−
ξ i
)
i=0,...,k
∈ Tk+1 are such that for i = 0, . . . , k,←−ξ i = T − ξk−i, and
∀i < k,←−ρ .l(←−ξ i) = ρ.l(ξk−i−1) ∧ ∀t ∈ [←−ξ i,←−ξ i+1),←−ρ .l(t) =←−ρ .l(←−ξ i) ∧←−ρ .x(t) =
ρ.x(T − t).
Theorem 1. For an HA M that admits a reverse HA ←−M, every trajectory ρ of M is
reversible, i.e., the reverse trajectory←−ρ of ρ is a trajectory of←−M, and every trajectory
←−ρ of←−M is forward-feasible, i.e., the reverse trajectory ρ of←−ρ is a trajectory ofM.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 .
Given an unsafe state u ∈ U of an HAM that admits a reverse HA←−M, Theorem 1
allows one to find a positive state s ∈ S(M) \ U from which u can be reached within
time T . The method works by simulating multiple trajectories of
←−M starting in u and up
to time T . In particular, we explore the reverse trajectories from u through an isotropic
random walk, i.e., by choosing uniformly at random, at each step of the simulation, the
next transition from those available.
3.3 Generation of Training Data and Test Data
We present three sampling methods for generation of training data and test data. Let X¯
denote the continuous component of S(M) \U , i.e., without the automaton’s location.
Recall that model parameters, when present, are expressed as (constant) continuous
state variables. They can be sampled independently from the other state variables using
appropriate distributions, possibly different from those described below.
Uniform Sampling. When the union of mode invariants covers X¯ , the algorithm first
uniformly samples a continuous state x from X¯ and then samples a mode m whose
invariant is consistent with x (i.e, x ∈ Inv(m)). When the union of mode invariants
3 Technically, for v non-injective,←−v is in general a nondeterministic reset:←−v : X −→ 2X .
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does not cover X¯ , we first uniformly sample the mode m and then a continuous state
x ∈ Inv(m). For simplicity, we restrict attention to cases where the region to be sam-
pled is rectangular, although we could use algorithms for uniform sampling of convex
polytopes [20]. We use the reachability checker or the simulator (for deterministic sys-
tems) to label the sampled states.
Balanced Sampling. In systems where the unsafe states U are a small part of the overall
state space, a uniform sampling strategy produces imbalanced datasets with insufficient
positive samples, causing the learned classifier to have relatively low accuracy. For
such systems, we generate balanced datasets with equal numbers of negative and pos-
itive samples as follows. Negative samples are obtained by uniformly sampling states
from S(M) \ U and invoking the reachability checker on those states. In this case,
the oracle only needs to verify that the sampled state is negative, i.e., to check that
M |= Reach(U, s, T ) is unsatisfiable. For deterministic systems, the simulator is used
instead. Positive samples are obtained by uniformly sampling unsafe states u from U
and invoking the backwards simulator from u.
Dynamics-Aware Sampling. This technique generates datasets according to a state dis-
tribution expected in a deployed system. It does this by estimating the probability that a
state is visited in a trajectory starting from the initial region Init within time T ′, where
T ′ > T . This is accomplished by uniformly sampling states from Init and performing
a random exploration of the trajectories from those states up to time T ′. The resulting
distribution, called dynamics-aware state distribution, is estimated from the multiset
of states encountered in those trajectories. In our experiments, we estimate a discrete
distribution, but other kinds of distributions (e.g., smooth kernel or piecewise-linear)
are also supported. The reachability checker or simulator is used to label states sampled
from the resulting distribution. This method typically yields highly unbalanced datasets,
and thus should not be applied on its own to generate training data.
3.4 Statistical Guarantees with Sequential Hypothesis Testing
Given the infeasibility of training machine-learning models with guaranteed accuracy
on unseen data4, we provide statistical guarantees a posteriori, i.e., after training. In-
spired by statistical approaches to model checking [24], we employ hypothesis testing
to certify that our classifiers meet prescribed levels of accuracy, and FN/FP rates.
We provide guarantees of the form PA ≥ θA (i.e., the true accuracy value is above
θA), PFN ≤ θFN and PFP ≤ θFP (i.e., the true rate of FNs and FPs are below θFN and
θFP, respectively). Being based on hypothesis testing, such guarantees are precise up to
arbitrary error bounds α, β ∈ (0, 1), such that the probability of Type-I errors (i.e., of
accepting Px < θx when Px ≥ θx, where x ∈ {A,FN,FP}) is bounded by α, and the
probability of Type-II errors (i.e., of accepting Px ≥ θx when Px < θx) is bounded by
β. The pair (α, β) is known as the strength of the test.
To ensure both error bounds simultaneously, the original test Px ≥ θx vs Px < θx
is relaxed by introducing a small indifference region, i.e., we test the hypothesis H0 :
4 Statistical learning theory [28] provides statistical bounds on the generalization error of learn
models, but these bounds are very conservative and thus of little use in practice. We use these
bounds, however, in the proof of Theorem 2.
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Px ≥ θx + δ against H1 : Px ≤ θx − δ for some δ > 0. We use Wald’s sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT) to provide the above guarantees. SPRT has the important
advantage that it does not require a prescribed number of samples to accept one of the
two hypotheses, but the decision is made if the available samples provide sufficient
evidence. Details of the SPRT can be found in Appendix B.
Note that in statistical model checking, SPRT is used to verify that a probabilistic
system satisfies a given property with probability above/below a given threshold. In
contrast, in NSC, SPRT is used to verify that the probability of the classifier producing
the correct prediction meets a given threshold.
3.5 Reducing the False Negative Rate
We discuss strategies to reduce the rate of FNs, the most serious errors from a safety-
critical perspective. Threshold selection is a simple, yet effective method, which is
based on tuning the classification threshold θ of the NN classifier (see Section 3.1).
Decreasing θ reduces the number of FNs but may increase the number of FPs and
thereby reduce overall accuracy. We evaluate the trade-off between accuracy and FNs
in Section 4.2.
Another way to reduce the FN rate is to re-train the classifier with unseen FN sam-
ples found in the test stage. For this purpose, we devised a whitebox falsification-guided
adaptation algorithm that, at each iteration, systematically searches for FNs using ad-
versarial sampling; i.e., by solving an optimization problem that seeks to maximize the
disagreement between predicted and true reachability values. The optimization prob-
lem exploits the knowledge it possesses of the function computed by the NN classifier
(whitebox approach). FNs found in this way are used to retrain the classifier. The algo-
rithm iterates until the falsifier cannot find any more FNs.
This approach can be viewed as the dual of counterexample-guided abstraction re-
finement [9]. CEGAR starts from an abstract model that represents an over-approxima-
tion of the system dynamics, and uses counterexamples (FPs) to refine the model,
thereby reducing the FP rate. Our approach starts from an under-approximation of the
positive region (i.e., the set of states leading to a violation) and uses counterexamples
(FNs) to make this region more conservative, reducing the FN rate.
We show that under some assumptions about the performance of the classifier and
the falsifier, our algorithm converges to an empty set of FNs. Although it may be dif-
ficult in practice to guarantee that these assumptions are satisfied, we also show in
Section 4.2 that our algorithm performs reasonably well in practice.
For a state s, let F (s) ∈ [0, 1] and b(s) ∈ {0, 1} be the NN prediction and true
reachability value, respectively. Let FN k denote the true set of false negatives (i.e.,
all states s such that b(s) = 1 and F (s) < θ) at the k-th iteration of the adaptation
algorithm, and let FˆN k denote the finite subset of FN k found by the falsifier. The
cumulative set of training samples at the k-th iteration of the algorithm is denotedDk =
D ∪⋃ki=1 FˆN k, where D is the set of samples for the initial training of the classifier.
Assumption 1 At each iteration k, the classifier correctly predicts positive training
samples, i.e., ∀s ∈ Dk. b(s) = 1 =⇒ F (s) ≥ θ, and is such that the FP rate w.r.t.
training samples is no larger than the FP rate w.r.t. unseen samples.
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Assumption 2 At each iteration k, the falsifier can always find an FN when it exists,
i.e., FN k 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ FˆN k 6= ∅.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–2, the adaptation algorithm converges to an empty
set of FNs with high probability, i.e., for all η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(limk→∞ FN k = ∅) ≥ 1−η.
Proof. See Appendix A.3 .
We developed a falsifier that uses a genetic algorithm (GA) [25], a nonlinear opti-
mization method for finding multiple global (sub-)optima. In our case, we indeed have
multiple solutions because FN samples are found at the decision boundaries of the clas-
sifier, separating the predicted positive and negative regions. Due to the real-valued state
space, each set FN k is either empty or infinite.
FN states have F (s) − b(s) < −θ, while FPs are such that F (s) − b(s) ≥ θ.
By maximizing the absolute discrepancy |F (s) − b(s)|, we can identify both FNs and
FPs, where only the former are kept for retraining. Specifically, the GA minimizes the
objective function o(s) = 1/(8 · (F (s)− b(s))2) which, for default threshold θ = 0.5,
gives a proportionally higher penalty to correctly predicted states (0.5 ≤ o(s) ≤ ∞)
than wrong predictions (0.125 ≤ o(s) ≤ 0.5). We retrain the network with all FN
candidates found by the GA, not just the optima.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our NSC approach on six hybrid-system case studies: a model of the spik-
ing neuron action potential [8], the classic inverted pendulum on a cart, a quadcopter
system [15], a cruise controller [8], a powertrain model [19], and a helicopter model [2].
These case studies represent a broad spectrum of hybrid systems and varying degrees
of complexity (deterministic, nondeterministic, nonlinear dynamics including trig func-
tions, 2–29 variables, 1–6 modes, 1–11 transitions). Detailed descriptions of the case
studies are given in Appendix D.
For all case studies, NSC neural networks were learned using MATLAB’s train
function, with the Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation algorithm optimizing the mean
square error loss function, and the Nguyen-Widrow initialization method for the NN
layers. With this setup, we achieved better performance than more standard approaches
such as minimizing binary cross entropy using stochastic gradient methods. Training is
very fast, taking 2 to 19 seconds for a training dataset with 20,000 samples.
We evaluated the following types of classifiers: sigmoid DNNs (DNN-S) with 3
hidden layers of 10 neurons each, with the Tan-Sigmoid activation function for the hid-
den layers and the Log-Sigmoid activation function for the output layer; shallow NNs
(SNN), with the same activation functions as DNN-S but with one hidden layer of 20
neurons; ReLU DNNs (DNN-R), with 3 hidden layers of 10 neurons each, the rectified
linear unit (ReLU) activation function for the hidden layers, and the softmax function
for the output layer; support vector machines with radial kernel (SVM); binary decision
trees (BDT); and a simple classifier that returns the label of the nearest neighbor in the
training set (NBOR). We also obtained results for DNN ensembles that combine the
predictions of multiple DNNs through majority voting. As expected, ensembles outper-
formed all of the other classifiers. Due to space limitations, these results are omitted.
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We learned the classifiers from relatively small datasets, using training sets of 20K
samples and test sets of 10K samples, except where noted otherwise. Larger training
sets significantly improved classifier performance for only two of the case studies; see
Figure 2. Unless otherwise specified, training and test sets are drawn from the same dis-
tribution. The NN architecture (numbers of layers and neurons) was chosen empirically.
To avoid overfitting, we did not tune the architecture to optimize the performance for
our data. We systematically evaluated other architectures (see Appendix E), but found
no alternatives with consistently better performance than our default configuration of 3
layers and 10 neurons. We also experimented with 1D Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), but they performed worse than the DNN architectures.
In the following, when clear from the context, we omit the modifier “empirical”
when referring to accuracy, FN, and FP rates over a test dataset (as opposed to the true
accuracy over the state distribution).
4.1 Performance Evaluation
Table 1 shows empirical accuracy and FN rate for all classifiers and case studies, using
uniform and balanced sampling. We obtain very high classification accuracy for neuron,
pendulum, quadcopter and cruise. For these case studies, DNN-based classifiers regis-
tered the best performance, with accuracy values ranging between 99.48 % and 99.98
% and FN rates between 0.24% and 0%. Only a minor performance degradation is ob-
served for the shallow neural network SNN, with accuracy in the range 98.89-99.85%.
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Fig. 2: Performance of DNN-S classifier on heli-
copter and powertrain models with varying num-
bers of training samples (uniform sampling).
In contrast, the accuracy for the heli-
copter and powertrain models is poor if
we use only 20K training samples. These
models are indeed particularly challeng-
ing, owing to their high dimensional-
ity (helicopter) and highly nonlinear dy-
namics (powertrain). Larger training sets
provide considerable improvement in ac-
curacy and FN rate, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. For helicopter, accuracy jumps
from 98.49% (20K samples) to 99.92%
(1M samples), and the FN rate decreases from 0.84% (20K) to 0.04% (1M). For power-
train, accuracy increases from 96.68% (20K) to 99.25% (1M), and the FN rate decreases
from 1.28% (20K) to 0.33% (1M).
In general, we found that the NN-based classifiers have superior accuracy compared
to support vector machines and binary decision trees. As expected, the nearest-neighbor
method demonstrated poor prediction capabilities. No single sampling method provides
a clear advantage over the others in terms of accuracy, most likely because training and
test sets are drawn from the same distribution.
Dynamics-aware state distribution. To evaluate the behavior of the classifiers with the
dynamics-aware state distribution (introduced in Section 3.3), we generate training data
with a combination of dynamics-aware sampling and either uniform or balanced sam-
pling, because dynamics-aware sampling alone yields unbalanced datasets unsuitable
for training. Test data consists exclusively of dynamics-aware samples.
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Neuron
Acc FN
DNN-S 99.81 0.1
DNN-R 99.52 0.29
SNN 99.17 0.43
SVM 98.73 0.75
BDT 99.3 0.37
NBOR 97.03 1.22
Acc FN
DNN-S 99.83 0.12
DNN-R 99.48 0.24
SNN 98.89 0.69
SVM 98.63 0.78
BDT 99.07 0.45
NBOR 96.95 1.62
Pendulum
Acc FN
99.98 0
99.93 0.04
99.81 0
99.84 0
99.6 0.17
99.69 0.14
Acc FN
99.89 0
99.63 0.01
99.2 0
99.37 0
99.46 0.05
99.51 0.04
Quadcopter
Acc FN
99.83 0.1
99.89 0.06
99.85 0.08
97.33 0.69
99.52 0.2
99.53 0.25
Acc FN
99.82 0.04
99.67 0.09
99.49 0.01
96.93 0.2
99.36 0.22
99.11 0.56
Cruise
Acc FN
99.95 0.01
99.98 0
99.84 0.15
99.88 0.1
99.84 0.08
99.49 0.33
Acc FN
99.94 0
99.95 0
99.6 0
99.61 0
99.9 0.03
99.47 0.11
Powertrain
Acc FN
96.68 1.28
96.21 1.08
96.02 1.37
92.26 3.48
95.59 2.19
71.44 14.51
Acc FN
97.2 0.86
96.07 1.24
95.21 1.79
91.84 3.3
95.86 2.4
71.33 13.99
Helicopter
Acc FN
U
niform
98.49 0.84
98 0.96
97.69 1.25
95.58 2.42
80.07 9.8
67.39 16.98
Acc FN
B
alanced
98.24 0.79
97.91 1.2
97.58 1.16
95.36 1.85
79.03 10.26
65.18 17.48
Table 1: Empirical accuracy (Acc) and FN rate of the state classifiers for each case study, classifier
type, and sampling method. Values are in percentages. For each measure and sampling method,
the best result is highlighted in bold. False positives and confidence intervals are reported in
Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix .
Table 2 shows that the classifiers yield accuracy values comparable to those of Ta-
ble 1 (compiled with balanced and uniform distributions) for all case studies. We see
that the powertrain model attains 100% accuracy, indicating that its dynamics-aware
distribution favors states that are easy enough for the DNN to classify correctly.
Neuron Pendulum Quadcopter Cruise Helicopter Powertrain
Unif+Dyn-aware 99.91 (+0.1) 99.93 (-0.05) 99.84 (+0.01) 99.14 (-0.81) 98.77 (+0.28) 100 (+3.32)
Bal+Dyn-aware 99.8 (-0.03) 99.88 (-0.01) 99.79 (-0.03) 99.35 (-0.59) 98.46 (+0.22) 100 (+2.8)
Table 2: Empirical accuracy of DNN-S classifiers tested on 10K dynamics-aware samples and
trained with 20K samples. Each row corresponds to a different training distribution. Unif+Dyn-
aware and Bal+Dyn-aware were obtained by combining 10K uniform/balanced samples with
10K dynamics-aware samples. In parenthesis is the accuracy difference with the corresponding
classifier from Table 1.
Num. of parameters
1 2 3 4 5
PˆA 99.8 99.7 97.9 98.1 97.8
PˆFN 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.3 1.5
Table 3: Empirical accuracy (PˆA)
and FN rate (PˆFN ) for DNN-S
classifier for neuron model with
increasing number of parameters.
Parametric analysis. We show that NSC works effec-
tively for parametric systems, being able to classify
states in models with parameter values not seen dur-
ing training. We derive parametric versions of the neu-
ron model by turning constants a, b, c, d, I (see Ap-
pendix D.1) into parameters uniformly distributed in
the ± 50% interval around their default value.
Table 3 shows the accuracy and FN rates for DNN-S, trained with 110K samples
for models with increasing numbers of parameters, which are increasingly long prefixes
of the sequence a, b, c, d, I . We achieve very high accuracy (≥ 99.7%) for up to two
parameters. For three to five parameters, the accuracy decreases but stays relatively
high (around 98%), suggesting that larger training sets are required for these cases.
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Indeed the input space grows exponentially in the number of parameters, while we kept
the size of the training set constant.
Statistical guarantees. We use SPRT (Section 3.4) to provide statistical guarantees for
four case studies, each trained with 20K balanced samples. See Table 4. We assess two
properties certifying that the true (not empirical) accuracy and FNs meet given perfor-
mance levels: PA ≥ 99.7%, and PFN ≤ 0.2%. We omit the helicopter and powertrain
models from this assessment, because performance results for these models are clearly
outside the desired levels when only 20K samples are used for training.
The only classifier that guarantees these performance levels for all case studies is
the sigmoid DNN. We also observe that a small number of samples suffices to obtain
statistical guarantees with the given strength: only 3 out of 48 tests needed more than
10K samples to reach a decision.
Neuron Pendulum Quadcopter Cruise
PA ≥ θA PFN ≤ θFN PA ≥ θA PFN ≤ θFN PA ≥ θA PFN ≤ θFN PA ≥ θA PFN ≤ θFN
DNN-S X (5800) X (2900) X (2300) X (2300) X (4400) X (2300) X (3000) X (2300)
DNN-R 7 (3600) 7 (8600) X (15500) X (4000) 7 (1400) X (7300) X (3000) X (2300)
SNN 7 (700) 7 (1000) 7 (2900) X (2300) 7 (1500) X (3400) 7 (3600) X (2300)
SVM 7 (400) 7 (600) 7 (6600) X (2300) 7 (200) 7 (5300) 7 (3400) X (2300)
BDT 7 (1700) 7 (3300) 7 (6300) X (15000) 7 (800) 7 (1100) X (2700) X (2900)
NBOR 7 (300) 7 (300) 7 (28500) X (2900) 7 (1000) 7 (1300) 7 (3400) 7 (2300)
Table 4: Statistical guarantees based on the SPRT. Samples were generated using balanced sam-
pling. In parenthesis are the number of samples required to reach the decision. Parameters of the
test are α = β = 0.01 and δ = 0.001. Thresholds are θA = 99.7% and θFN = 0.2%.
4.2 Reducing the False Negative Rate
Falsification-guided adaptation. We evaluate the benefits of adaptation by incremen-
tally adapting the trained NNs with false negative samples (see Section 3.5). At each
iteration, we run our GA-based falsifier to find FN samples, which are then used to
adapt the DNN. The adaptation loop terminates when the falsifier cannot find a FN.
We employ MATLAB’s adapt function with gradient descent learning algorithm
and learning rates of 0.0005 for neuron and 0.003 for quadcopter, helicopter, and power-
train. For neuron and quadcopter, we use DNN-S classifiers trained with 20K balanced
samples. We use DNN-S trained with 1M balanced samples for helicopter, and DNN-S
trained with 1M uniform samples for powertrain, because these classifiers have the best
accuracy before adaptation. To measure adaptation performances, we test the DNNs on
10K samples after each iteration of adaptation. Fig. 3 shows how accuracy, FNs and
FPs of the classifier evolve at each adaptation step. For the neuron, quadcopter, and he-
licopter case studies, our falsification-guided adaptation algorithm works well to elimi-
nate the FN rate at the cost of a slight increase in the FP rate after only 5-10 iterations.
In these case studies, the number of FNs found by the falsifier decreases quickly from
hundreds or thousands to zero. For powertrain, the number of FNs found by the falsifier
stays almost constant at about 70 on average at each iteration. After 150 iterations, FN
rate of the powertrain DNN decreases slowly from 0.33% to 0.15%.
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Figure 4 visualizes the effects of adaptation on the DNN-S classifier for the neuron
case study. Fig. 4 (a) shows the prediction of the DNN after training with 20K samples.
Fig. 4 (b) shows the prediction of the DNN after adaptation. We see that adaptation
expands the predicted positive region to enclose all previous FN samples, i.e., they are
correctly re-classified as positive. The enlarged positive region also means the adapted
DNN is more conservative, producing more FPs as shown in Fig. 4 (b).
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Fig. 3: Impact of incremental adaptation on empirical accuracy, FN and FP rates. FP-rate curve
for powertrain is omitted to allow using a scale that shows the decreasing trend of the FN rate.
The FP rate for powertrain increases from 0.48% to 2.89%.
(a) Before adaptation (b) After adaptation
Fig. 4: Effects of adaptation on the DNN-S for the neuron case study. The white region is the
predicted negative region. The yellow region is the predicted positive region. Red dots are FN
samples. Crosses are FP samples.
Threshold selection. We show that threshold selection can considerably reduce the FN
rate. Figure 5 shows the effect of threshold selection on accuracy, FN rate, and FP rate
for classifier DNN-S trained with uniform sampling (20K samples for neuron and quad-
copter, 1M samples for helicoper and powertrain). Pendulum and cruise control case
studies are excluded as they have low FN rate (≤ 0.01%) prior to threshold selection.
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Fig. 5: Impact of classification threshold on empirical accuracy, FN rate, and FP rate.
For the neuron case study, selecting θ = 0.32 reduces the FN rate from 10−3 to
5 · 10−4, with an accuracy loss of only 0.02%. With θ = 0.06, we obtain a zero FN rate
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and a minor accuracy loss of 0.37%. For quadcopter, selecting θ = 0.28 decreases the
FN rate from 4 · 10−4 to 10−4, with an accuracy loss of just 0.02%. Selecting θ = 0.16
yields zero FN rate and accuracy loss of just 0.12%. For helicopter, selecting θ = 0.33
reduces the FN rate from 3 · 10−4 to 2 · 10−4, with an accuracy gain of 0.01%. For
powertrain, θ = 0.34 yields a good trade-off between FN rate reduction (from 3.3·10−3
to 2.1 · 10−3) and accuracy loss (0.1%).
5 Related Work
Related work includes techniques for simulation-based verification, which enables rig-
orous system analysis from finitely many executions. Statistical model checking [24]
for the verification of probabilistic systems with statistical guarantees is an example of
this form of verification. Simulation is also used for falsification and reachability analy-
sis of hybrid systems [1,2]. Our NSC approach also simulates system executions (when
the system is deterministic), but for the purpose of learning a state classifier.
Other applications of machine learning in verification include parameter synthesis
of stochastic systems [5], techniques for inferring temporal logic specifications from
examples [4], synthesis of invariants for program verification [27,14], and reachability
checking of Markov decision processes [6].
For safety-critical applications, verification of NNs has become a very active area,
with a focus on the derivation of adversarial inputs (i.e., those that induce incorrect
predictions). Most such approaches rely on SMT-based techniques [18,21,11], while
sampling-based methods are used in [10] for the analysis of NN components “in the
loop” with cyber-physical system models. Similarly, our adaptation method systemat-
ically searches for adversarial inputs (FNs) to render the classifier more conservative.
A related problem is that of range estimation [29], i.e., computing safe and tight enclo-
sures for the predictions of an NN over a (convex) input region. Such methods could be
used to extend NSC classification to sets of states.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced the state classification problem for hybrid systems and offered a
highly efficient solution based on neural state classification. NSC features high accu-
racy and low false-negative rates, while including techniques for virtually eliminating
such errors and for certifying an NSC classifier’s performance with statistical guaran-
tees. Plans for future work include considering more expressive temporal properties and
extending our approach to stochastic hybrid systems.
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A Proofs
A.1 Shallow NNs are universal approximators for state classification
We first need the following mild assumptions:
1. S(M) is compact and Euclidean. This is satisfied in any practical instance of the
SCP (after mapping discrete locations into R), e.g., by specifying the state space as
a convex set.
2. T ⊂ Q, i.e., the time domain is rational (and not dense). This means that trajectories
(and thus, reachability) are not considered at irrational time points, an assumption
that is reasonable and at the core of any hybrid system simulation/verification tool.
3. The true state classifier F ∗ of Definition 5 is such that, for any s ∈ S(M), F ∗(s′)
is constant for all s′ ∈ B(s), where B(s) is the smallest rectangle with rational
endpoints containing s. This is also quite reasonable, as reachability tools typically
work by replacing s with the smallest box with endpoints that are representable in
machine arithmetic.
Proof. To prove that shallow NNs are universal approximators for the true state classi-
fier F ∗, we need to demonstrate that F ∗ is defined over a compact set (true by assump-
tion 1), and that F ∗ is Borel-measurable.
The latter is proved by showing that the positive (or, equivalently, negative) region
F ∗−1(1) is a Borel set, i.e., it is formed from countable union, intersection and com-
plement of closed (or open) sets.
Note that the set of states reachable from s within time T is Borel as it is defined
by R(s, T ) =
⋃
t≤T {ρ(t) | ρ is a trajectory from s} where ρ(t) is the state at time t
in trajectory ρ. By assumption 2, the outermost union is countable and thus, R(s, T )
is Borel because, due to the finite number of HA locations, there is a finite number
of trajectories from s. Then, we can define the positive region by F ∗−1(1) = {s ∈
S(M) | R(s, T ) ∩ U 6= ∅}, which by assumption 3, is equivalent to F ∗−1(1) = {s′ ∈
S(M) ∩ Qn | R(s′, T ) ∩ U 6= ∅}. The latter is constructed by countable union (we
consider only rational states s′), and thus, F ∗−1(1) is Borel. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we give a proof for the first part of Theorem 1, i.e., every trajectory of
M is reversible. The proof for the second part, i.e., every trajectory of←−M is forward-
feasible, is similar.
Proof. Consider a trajectory ρ(t) = (l(t),x(t)) ofM starting in state s(0) = (ρ.l(0),
ρ.x(0)) and ending in state s(T ) = (ρ.l(T ), ρ.x(T )), and its corresponding sequence
of switching time points (ξρi )i=0...k. Let
←−ρ (t) be the reverse trajectory of ρ, and let
(
←−
ξ i)i=0...k be the corresponding switching time points of ←−ρ . We prove that ←−ρ is a
trajectory of
←−M, i.e., we prove that:
1.
←−
ξ 0 = 0,
←−
ξ i <
←−
ξ i+1 ∀i = 0, . . . , k−1, and←−ξ k = T , i.e., the sequence of reverse
switching time points increases, starts with 0 and ends with T .
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2. ←−ρ .l(0) = ρ.l(T ), ←−ρ .x(0) = ρ.x(T ), ←−ρ .l(T ) = ρ.l(0), ←−ρ .x(T ) = ρ.x(0), i.e.,
the reverse trajectory starts in ρ’s terminal state and ends in ρ’s initial sate.
3. ∀i = 0, . . . , k − 1, ∀t ∈ [←−ξ i,←−ξ i+1). ←−ρ .x˙(t) = ←−M.Flow(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))(←−ρ .x(t)),
i.e., the continuous evolution is consistent with the differential equation of the cor-
responding location in
←−M.
4. ∀i = 0, . . . , k − 1,∀t ∈ [←−ξ i,←−ξ i+1). ←−ρ .x(t) ∈ ←−M.Inv(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i)), i.e., ←−ρ is
consistent with
←−M’s invariants.
5. ∀i = 0, . . . , k − 1. ∃(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i),←−g ,←−v ,←−ρ .l(←−ξ i+1)) ∈ ←−M.Trans :←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1) ∈←−g ∧ ←−ρ .x(←−ξ i+1) ∈ ←−v (←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)), where←−ρ .x(
←−
ξ −i+1) = limt→←−ξ −i+1
←−ρ .x(t),
i.e.,←−ρ is consistent with←−M’s transition relations. Note that we take liberties with
notation here and in the proof that follows: if←−v is deterministic, then←−ρ .x(←−ξ i+1) ∈←−v (←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)) really means←−ρ .x(
←−
ξ i+1) =
←−v (←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)).
Proof of 1. From the definition of trajectory ξ0 = 0, ξk = T , and ξi < ξi+1,∀i =
0, . . . , k − 1. Therefore, from the definition of reverse trajectory,←−ξ 0 = T − ξk = 0,←−
ξ k = T − ξ0 = T , and←−ξ i = T − ξk−i < T − ξk−i−1 =←−ξ i+1,∀i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
Proof of 2. From the definition of reverse trajectory, we readily obtain ←−ρ .l(0) =
ρ.l(T ),←−ρ .x(0) = ρ.x(T ),←−ρ .l(T ) = ρ.l(0),←−ρ .x(T ) = ρ.x(0).
Proof of 3. Consider the time interval (
←−
ξ i,
←−
ξ i+1) of the reverse trajectory and the
corresponding time interval (ξk−i−1, ξk−i) of the forward trajectory. We have ∀t ∈
(ξk−i−1, ξk−i), ρ.x˙(t) = M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(ρ.x(t)). That means, for all t ∈
(ξk−i−1, ξk−i), we have the following equivalent equations:
ρ.x(ξk−i) = ρ.x(t) +
∫ ξk−i
t
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(t) = ρ.x(ξk−i)−
∫ ξk−i
t
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(t) = ρ.x(ξk−i)−
∫ T−t
T−ξk−i
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(t) = ρ.x(ξk−i) +
∫ T−t
T−ξk−i
−M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(t) = ρ.x(ξk−i) +
∫ T−t
T−ξk−i
−M.F low(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))(x(τ))dτ
←−ρ .x(T − t) =←−ρ .x(←−ξi ) +
∫ T−t
←−
ξ i
←−M.F low(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))(x(τ))dτ
The last equation means for all t ∈ (←−ξ i,←−ξ i+1), we have:
←−ρ .x˙(t) =←−M.Flow(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))(←−ρ .x(t)). (2)
Since
←−
ξ i is a switching time point, x(
←−
ξ i) is the initial condition for the evolution
of x in mode←−ρ .l(←−ξ i). Therefore, Eq. 2 holds for all t ∈ [←−ξ i,←−ξ i+1).
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Proof of 4. Consider the time interval [
←−
ξ i,
←−
ξ i+1) of the reverse trajectory and the
corresponding time interval [ξk−i−1, ξk−i) of the forward trajectory. We have←−ρ .x(t) =
ρ.x(T − t) ∈M.Inv(ρ.l(ξk−i−1)) =M.Inv(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i)) =←−M.Inv(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))
Proof of 5. Consider a time point
←−
ξ i+1, 0 ≤ i < k, when the reverse trajectory
jumps from mode ←−ρ .l(←−ξ i) to mode ←−ρ .l(←−ξ i+1). According to definition of reverse
trajectory, this time point corresponds to the time point ξk−i−1 in the forward trajec-
tory when the transition (ρ.l(ξk−i−2), g, v, ρ.l(ξk−i−1)) occurs. By definition of reverse
HA, there exists a transition (ρ.l(ξk−i−1),←−g ,←−v , ρ.l(ξk−i−2)) in←−M.T rans. By defi-
nition of reverse trajectory, this transition is the same as (←−ρ .l(←−ξ i),←−g ,←−v ,←−ρ .l(ξi+1)).
We prove that←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1) ∈ ←−g and←−ρ .x(
←−
ξ i+1) ∈ ←−v (←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)).
We have ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = v(ρ.x(ξ−k−i−1)) and
←−v is the inverse of v, therefore:
ρ.x(ξ−k−i−1) ∈ ←−v (ρ.x(ξk−i−1)) (3)
Since←−g = v(g) and ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = v(ρ.x(ξ−k−i−1)), we also have:
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) ∈ ←−g (4)
Consider the interval [ξk−i−1, ξk−i), we have the following equivalent equations.
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = lim
t−→ξ+k−i−1
ρ.x(ξk−i)−
∫ ξk−i
t
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = lim
T−t−→(T−ξk−i−1)−ρ.x(ξk−i)−
∫ T−t
T−ξk−i
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = lim
t−→(←−ξ i+1)−
←−ρ .x(←−ξ i)−
∫ t
←−
ξ i
M.F low(ρ.l(ξk−i−1))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) = lim
t−→(←−ξ i+1)−
←−ρ .x(←−ξ i) +
∫ t
←−
ξ i
←−M.F low(←−ρ .l(←−ξ i))(x(τ))dτ
ρ.x(ξk−i−1) =←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)
Combining with Eq. 4, we obtain←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i ) ∈ ←−g .
Similarly, we can show that ←−ρ .x(←−ξ i+1) = ρ.x(ξ−k−i−1). Combining with Eq. 3,
we have←−ρ .x(←−ξ i+1) ∈ ←−v (←−ρ .x(←−ξ −i+1)).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof follows from Vapnik’s bounds for the generalization error of learning
models [28], stating that Pr(Pˆ teerr ≤ Pˆ trerr + f(m,D, η)) ≥ 1− η, where Pˆ teerr is the test
error, Pˆ trerr is the training error, m is the number of training samples, and D is the VC
dimension which is fixed and characterizes the expressiveness of the learning model.
In particular, limm→∞ f(m,D, η) = 0, as the expression is defined by f(m,D, η) =√
1
m (D(log(2m/d) + 1)− log(η/4)). Rewrite Pˆ teerr = Pˆ teFP + Pˆ teFN as the sum of FP
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and FN errors, and similarly for Pˆ trerr. By assumption 1, Pˆ
tr
FP ≤ Pˆ teFP and Pˆ trFN = 0.
Thus, we can rewrite Vapnik’s bounds as Pr(Pˆ teFN ≤ f(m,D, η)) ≥ 1 − η, implying
that Pr(limm→∞ Pˆ teFN = 0) ≥ 1− η. By assumption 2, the limit m→∞ is attainable
(the falsifier can always produce FNs if available), unless the falsifier cannot find any,
which implies FN k = ∅ in absolute terms. Finally note that limm→∞ Pˆ teFN = 0 is
equivalent to our hypothesis limk→∞ FN k = ∅. uunionsq
B Statistical guarantees with Sequential Probability Ratio Test
We provide guarantees of the form PA ≥ θA (i.e., the true accuracy value is above
θA), PFN ≤ θFN and PFP ≤ θFP (i.e., the true rate of FNs and FPs are below θFN and
θFP, respectively). Being based on hypothesis testing, such guarantees are precise up to
arbitrary error bounds α, β ∈ (0, 1), such that the probability of Type-I errors (i.e., of
accepting Px < θx when Px ≥ θx, where x ∈ {A,FN,FP}) is bounded by α, and the
probability of Type-II errors (i.e., of accepting Px ≥ θx when Px < θx) is bounded by
β. The pair (α, β) is known as the strength of the test.
To ensure both error bounds simultaneously, the original test Px ≥ θx vs Px < θx
is relaxed by introducing a small indifference region, i.e., we test the hypothesis H0 :
Px ≥ p0 against H1 : Px ≤ p1, with p0 > p1 [24]. Typically, p0 = θx + δ and
p1 = θx − δ for some δ > 0. We use Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) to
provide the above guarantees. SPRT has the important advantage that it does not require
a prescribed number of samples to accept one of the two hypotheses, but the decision is
made if the available samples provide sufficient evidence. Specifically, afterm samples,
H0 is accepted if p1mp0m ≤ B, while H1 is accepted if
p1m
p0m
≥ A, where A = (1− β)/α,
B = β/(1 − α) and p1mp0m =
ptm1 ·(1−p1)fm
ptm0 ·(1−p0)fm
, where tm and fm are, respectively, the
numbers of positive and negative samples.
C Background on Neural Networks
Let l be the number of layers of an NN, i.e., l − 1 hidden layers and one output layer.
Let ni be the number of neurons in layer i, i = 1, . . . , l, with n0 being the size of the
input vector.
For an input vector x ∈ Rn0 , the output of the NN classifier is positive if F (x) ≥ θ,
negative otherwise, where F (x) is the function represented by the NN and θ is the
classification threshold. Function F is of the following form:
F = fl ◦ fl−1 ◦ . . . ◦ f1 ◦ f0,
where ◦ is the function composition operator, f0 is the input normalization function, and
for i = 1, . . . , l, fi is the function computed by the i-th layer. The input normalization
function typically applies a linear scaling such that the input falls in the range [−1, 1].
The output of layer i results from applying function fi : Rni−1 → Rni to the output
of the previous layer:
fi (pi−1) = gi (Wi,i−1 · pi−1 + bi) , i = 1, . . . , l (5)
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where pi−1 ∈ Rni−1 is the output vector of layer i − 1, Wi,i−1 ∈ Rni×ni−1 is the
weight matrix that connects pi−1 to the neurons of layer i, bi ∈ Rni is the bias vector
of layer i, and gi is the activation function of the neurons of layer i.
Weights and biases are the function parameters learned during training, and are typ-
ically derived by minimizing the mean square error (or other error functions) between
training data and network predictions. The most common optimization algorithm is
gradient descent with backpropagation.
We consider two main static configurations of NNs. The first, called DNN-S, uses
the Tan-Sigmoid activation function tansig for the hidden layers and the Log-Sigmoid
activation function logsig for the output layer l. Let z ∈ Rni be the argument of the
activation function at layer i. Then, for neuron j = 1, . . . , ni, the above activation
functions are given by:
tansig(z)j =
2
1 + e−2·zj
− 1 and logsig(z)j = 1
1 + e−zj
. (6)
The second configuration, called DNN-R, employs the rectified linear unit (ReLU)
activation function relu for the hidden layers and the softmax function for the output
layer l, where
relu(z)j = max(0, zj) and softmax(z)j =
ezj∑ni
k=1 e
zk
. (7)
D Models and case studies
We briefly introduce the case studies that we used for our evaluation.
Spiking Neuron. This model describes the evolution of a neuron’s action potential. It is a
deterministic HA with two continuous variables, one mode, one transition and nonlinear
polynomial dynamics. We consider the unsafe set U defined by v ≤ 68.5, expressing
that the neuron should not undershoot its resting potential. The time bound for the
reachability property is T = 20.
Inverted Pendulum. We consider the classic inverted pendulum on a cart nonlinear sys-
tem. We consider the unsafe set U defined by |θ| > pi/4, corresponding to the safety
property that keeps the pendulum within 45◦ of the vertical axis. The time bound is
T = 5.
Quadcopter Controller. This model describes the dynamics of a quadcopter [15]. It is a
deterministic HA with seven continuous variables, two modes and nonlinear dynamics
including trigonometric functions. We consider the safety property that the quadcopter
does not crash within time T = 15. The set U is defined by the constraint z ≤ 0, where
z is the vehicle’s altitude.
Cruise Control. It is a nondeterministic HA with 3 continuous variables, 6 modes, 11
transitions, and nonlinear polynomial dynamics. The unsafe setU is defined by v ≤ −1,
which expresses that the vehicle’s speed should not be below a reference speed by 1 m/s
or more. The reachability time bound is T = 10.
Powertrain Model. The automotive air-fuel control system model from [19] is a HA
with two modes and five nonlinear ODEs describing the dynamics of the engine (throttle
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air, intake manifold and air-fuel path), coupled with a continuous-time PI controller. U
is defined by |(λ− λ¯)/λ¯| > 0.5, where λ is a variable describing the air-fuel ratio and
λ¯ is the target λ value. The time bound is T = 1. Since the system is already well
described in [19], we do not provide the details here.
Helicopter Controller. We augment the 28-variable helicopter controller available on
SpaceEx website5 with a variable z denoting the helicopter’s altitude. The dynamics of
z is given by z˙ = vz , where vz is the vertical velocity and represented by variable x8.
The unsafe set U is defined by z ≤ 0. The time bound is T = 5. Since this model is
large and publicly available on SpaceEx website, we do not provide the details here.
D.1 Spiking Neuron
We consider the spiking neuron model on the Flow* website6. It is a hybrid system with
one mode and one jump. The dynamics is defined by the ODE{
v˙ = 0.04v2 + 5v + 140− u+ I
u˙ = a · (b · v − u) (8)
The jump condition is v ≥ 30, and the associated reset is v′ := c ∧ u′ := u + d,
where, for any variable x, x′ denotes the value of x after the reset.
The parameters are a = 0.02, b = 0.2, c = −65, d = 8, and I = 40 as re-
ported on the Flow* website. We consider the unsafe state set U = {(v, u) | v ≤ 68.5}.
This corresponds to a safety property that can be understood as the neuron does not
undershoot its resting-potential region of [−68.5,−60]. The domain for sampling is
68.5 < v ≤ 30 ∧ 0 ≤ u ≤ 25. The time bound for the reachability property was set to
T = 20.
D.2 Inverted Pendulum
We consider the control system for an inverted pendulum on a cart. This is a classic,
widely used example of a non-linear system. As shown in Fig. 6, the control input F is
a force applied to the cart with the goal of keeping the pendulum in upright position,
i.e., θ = 0. The dynamics is given by
J · θ¨ = m · l · g · sin(θ)−m · l cos(θ) · F (9)
where J is the moment of inertia, m is the mass of the pendulum, l is the length of the
rod, and g is the gravitational acceleration.
We set J = 1, m = 1/g, l = 1, and let u = F/g. Eq. 9 becomes{
θ˙ = ω
ω˙ = sin(θ)− cos(θ) · u (10)
5 http://spaceex.imag.fr/
6 https://flowstar.org/examples/
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Fig. 6: Schematic of the inverted pendulum on a cart. Source: Wikipedia.
We consider the control law of Eq. 11. Fig. 7 shows an evolution of θ under this
control law. We consider the unsafe state set U = {(θ, ω) | θ < −pi/4 ∨ θ > pi/4}.
This unsafe region corresponds to the safety property that keeps the pendulum within
45◦ of the vertical axis. The domain for sampling is θ ∈ [−pi/4, pi/4]∧ω ∈ [−1.5, 1.5].
We used time bound T = 5.
u =

2 · ω + θ + sin(θ)
cos(θ)
, E ∈ [−1, 1], | ω | + | θ |≤ 1.85
0, E ∈ [−1, 1], | ω | + | θ |> 1.85
ω
1+ | ω | cos(θ), E < −1
−ω
1+ | ω | cos(θ), E > 1
(11)
where E = 0.5 · ω + (cos(θ)− 1) is the pendulum energy.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Time
0
pi/16
pi/8
3pi/16
pi/4
5pi/16
θ
(t)
Fig. 7: An evolution of the inverted pendulum state variable θ from initial state (θ0, ω0) =
(0.5, 1.0).
D.3 Quadcopter Controller
We consider the quadcopter model of [15]. We consider the safety property that the
quadcopter does not crash, i.e., the altitude z is positive. This corresponds to the unsafe
state set U defined by z ≤ 0. This safety property is independent of the state variables
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x, y, and ψ (the yaw angle), so we omit them from the model. This hybrid system has
two modes that share the following ODEs.
dωx
dt
=
L · k · (ω21 − ω23)− (Iyy − Izz) · ωy · ωz
Ixx
dωy
dt
=
L · k · (ω22 − ω24)− (Izz − Ixx) · ωx · ωz
Iyy
dωz
dt
=
b · (ω21 − ω22 + ω23 − ω24)− (Ixx − Iyy) · ωx · ωy
Izz
dφ
dt
= ωx +
sin (φ) sin (θ)(
sin(φ)2 cos(θ)
cos(φ)
+ cos (φ) cos (θ)
)
cos (φ)
ωy
+
sin (θ)
sin(φ)2 cos(θ)
cos(φ)
+ cos (φ) cos (θ)
ωz
dθ
dt
= −
 sin (φ)2 cos (θ)(
sin(φ)2 cos(θ)
cos(φ)
ωy + cos (φ) cos (θ)
)
cos (φ)2
+
1
cos (φ)
ωy
− sin (φ) cos (θ)(
sin(φ)2 cos(θ)
cos(φ)
+ cos (φ) cos (θ)
)
cos (φ)
ωz
dz
dt
= z˙
(12)
where the dynamics of z is given by:
(mode 1)
dz˙
dt
=
g + cos(θ) · k · (ω21 + ω22 + ω23 + ω24)+ k · d · z˙
m
(13)
(mode 2)
dz˙
dt
=
−g − cos(θ) · k · (ω21 + ω22 + ω23 + ω24)− k · d · z˙
m
(14)
The jump from mode 1 to mode 2 happens when z = 500, updating variables to
ω′1 := 0 ∧ ω′2 := 1 ∧ ω′3 := 0 ∧ ω′4 := 1. The jump from mode 2 to mode 1 occurs at
z = 200, updating variables to ω′1 := 1 ∧ ω′2 := 0 ∧ ω′3 := 1 ∧ ω′4 := 0.
The parameters are L = 0.23, k = 5.2, k · d = 7.5e−7, m = 0.65, b = 3.13e−5,
g = 9.8, Ixx = 0.0075, Iyy = 0.0075, Izz = 0.013. The domain for sampling is
ωx ∈ [−0.05, 0.05], ωy ∈ [0, 0.1], ωz ∈ [−0.1, 0.1], φ ∈ [−0.2, 0.2], θ ∈ [−1, 0.4],
z˙ ∈ [−150, 150], and z ∈ [50, 100]. We chose time bound T = 15.
D.4 Cruise Control
The cruise control is a nondeterministic HA with three continuous variables, six modes,
eleven transitions, and nonlinear polynomial dynamics. It is shown in Fig. 8. The con-
tinuous variable v denotes the difference between the vehicle’s speed and the cruise
speed inm/s, x is the integral term for the proportional-integral (PI) controller in mode
5, and t is a clock.
In mode 5, the PI controller tries to stabilize v to zero, i.e., to match the vehicle’s
speed with the cruise speed. Mode 3 and 4 represent the first level of brakes where
24
deceleration increases smoothly from 1.2 to 2.5 m/s2 in mode 4 and stays constant at
2.5 m/s2 in mode 3. Mode 1 and 2 represent the second level of brakes and work in the
same way but with higher starting and peak deceleration. Mode 6 constantly accelerates
the vehicle. The guards are designed to prevent chattering or Zeno behavior.
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Fig. 8: Hybrid automaton for the cruise control system. Invariants are in blue, guards are in red,
and reset mappings are in green.
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Fig. 9: Reverse hybrid automaton for the cruise control system. Invariants are in blue, guards are
in red, and reset mappings are in green.
The unsafe set U is defined by v ≤ −1, which expresses that the vehicle’s speed
should not be below a reference speed by 1 m/s or more. The reachability time bound
is T = 10.
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E Architecture Comparison
The performance of NNs strongly depends on the chosen architecture. For this reason
we evaluated different setups by changing the number of layers and neurons per layer
for our DNN-S model. Figure 10 summarizes the accuracy values obtained for each
architecture.
We see that as we increase the model complexity there is a tendency to overfit the
training data, especially for the quadcopter and cruise case studies. For the neuron and
pendulum, we observe that while many model configurations lead to a high accuracy
score, having only a single hidden layer and 5 neurons is not sufficient to learn the
reachability function. In general, our default configuration of 3 layers and 10 neurons
provides a reasonable architectural baseline.
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Fig. 10: Heatmaps showing accuracy as a function of number of neurons (horizontal axis) and
number of layers (vertical axis).
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1
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0.
22
)
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)
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)
0.
18
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7
(9
8.
9,
99
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(0
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)
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4
(0
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M
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41
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)
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(0
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)
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5,
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D
T
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3,
0.
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)
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,0
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B
O
R
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3
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7.
45
)
1.
75
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)
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.9
5,
1.
54
)
N
eu
ro
n
(b
al
an
ce
d)
A
cc
FN
FP
D
N
N
-S
99
.8
3
(9
9.
69
,9
9.
92
)
0.
12
(0
.0
4,
0.
25
)
0.
05
(0
.0
1,
0.
15
)
D
N
N
-R
99
.4
8
(9
9.
26
,9
9.
65
)
0.
24
(0
.1
3,
0.
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3
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9,
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)
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2,
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O
R
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.9
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38
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(1
.3
1,
1.
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)
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(1
.1
4,
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)
Q
ua
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op
te
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fo
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A
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D
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N
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67
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92
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0.
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4
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2,
0.
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)
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R
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9
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,9
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)
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(0
.2
,0
.5
1)
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(0
.0
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C
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e
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A
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FN
FP
D
N
N
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99
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4
(9
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,9
9.
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)
0
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,0
.0
6)
0.
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.0
1,
0.
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)
D
N
N
-R
99
.9
5
(9
9.
85
,9
9.
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)
0
(0
,0
.0
6)
0.
05
(0
.0
1,
0.
15
)
SN
N
99
.6
(9
9.
4,
99
.7
5)
0
(0
,0
.0
6)
0.
4
(0
.2
5,
0.
6)
SV
M
99
.6
1
(9
9.
41
,9
9.
76
)
0
(0
,0
.0
6)
0.
39
(0
.2
4,
0.
59
)
B
D
T
99
.9
(9
9.
78
,9
9.
97
)
0.
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(0
,0
.1
1)
0.
07
(0
.0
2,
0.
18
)
N
B
O
R
99
.4
7
(9
9.
25
,9
9.
64
)
0.
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(0
.0
4,
0.
23
)
0.
42
(0
.2
7,
0.
62
)
Ta
bl
e
5:
A
cc
ur
ac
y
(A
cc
)
an
d
FN
ra
te
of
th
e
st
at
e
cl
as
si
fie
rs
on
th
e
pe
nd
ul
um
,n
eu
ro
n,
qu
ad
co
pt
er
an
d
cr
ui
se
ca
se
st
ud
ie
s.
A
ll
re
su
lts
ar
e
ex
pr
es
se
d
as
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
an
d
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
as
a
(b
,c
),
w
he
re
a
is
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
m
ea
n
an
d
(b
,c
)
is
th
e
(o
pe
n)
99
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
(c
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
ov
er
-a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
io
n
to
th
e
cl
os
es
td
ec
im
al
).
Fo
re
ac
h
m
ea
su
re
an
d
sa
m
pl
in
g
m
et
ho
d,
th
e
be
st
re
su
lt
is
hi
gh
lig
ht
ed
in
bo
ld
.
27
Pow
ertrain
(uniform
)
A
cc
FN
FP
D
N
N
-S
96.68
(96.19,97.13)
1.28
(1,1.6)
2.04
(1.69,2.44)
D
N
N
-R
96.21
(95.69,96.69)
1.08
(0.83,1.38)
2.71
(2.3,3.16)
SN
N
96.02
(95.48,96.51)
1.37
(1.08,1.7)
2.61
(2.21,3.05)
SV
M
92.26
(91.54,92.94)
3.48
(3.02,3.98)
4.26
(3.75,4.81)
B
D
T
95.59
(95.03,96.11)
2.19
(1.83,2.6)
2.22
(1.85,2.63)
N
B
O
R
71.44
(70.26,72.6)
14.51
(13.61,15.44)14.05
(13.16,14.97)
Pow
ertrain
(balanced)
A
cc
FN
FP
D
N
N
-S
97.2
(96.74,97.61)
0.86
(0.64,1.13)
1.94
(1.6,2.33)
D
N
N
-R
96.07
(95.54,96.56)
1.24
(0.97,1.56)
2.69
(2.29,3.14)
SN
N
95.21
(94.63,95.75)
1.79
(1.46,2.17)
3
(2.57,3.47)
SV
M
91.84
(91.1,92.54)
3.3
(2.85,3.79)
4.86
(4.32,5.45)
B
D
T
95.86
(95.31,96.36)
2.4
(2.02,2.83)
1.74
(1.42,2.11)
N
B
O
R
71.33
(70.15,72.49)13.99
(13.1,14.91)14.68
(13.78,15.62)
H
elicopter
(uniform
)
A
cc
FN
FP
D
N
N
-S
98.49
(98.14,98.79)
0.84
(0.62,1.11)
0.67
(0.47,0.92)
D
N
N
-R
98
(97.61,98.35)
0.96
(0.72,1.25)
1.04
(0.79,1.34)
SN
N
97.69
(97.27,98.06)
1.25
(0.98,1.57)
1.06
(0.81,1.36)
SV
M
95.58
(95.02,96.1)
2.42
(2.04,2.85)
2
(1.65,2.39)
B
D
T
80.07
(79.02,81.09)
9.8
(9.04,10.6)
10.13
(9.36,10.94)
N
B
O
R
67.39
(66.16,68.6)
16.98
(16.02,17.97)15.63
(14.7,16.59)
H
elicopter
(balanced)
A
cc
FN
FP
D
N
N
-S
98.24
(97.87,98.57)
0.79
(0.58,1.05)
0.97
(0.73,1.26)
D
N
N
-R
97.91
(97.51,98.27)
1.2
(0.93,1.51)
0.89
(0.66,1.17)
SN
N
97.58
(97.15,97.96)
1.16
(0.9,1.47)
1.26
(0.99,1.58)
SV
M
95.36
(94.79,95.89)
1.85
(1.52,2.23)
2.79
(2.38,3.25)
B
D
T
79.03
(77.96,80.07)
10.26
(9.49,11.07)
10.71
(9.92,11.54)
N
B
O
R
65.18
(63.94,66.41)17.48
(16.51,18.48)17.34
(16.37,18.34)
Table
6:A
ccuracy
(A
cc)and
FN
rate
ofthe
state
classifiers
on
the
pow
ertrain
and
helicoptercase
studies.See
caption
oftable
6
fordetails
on
notation.
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